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Introduction
Imagine that you are a freelance writer in the United
States. You sell an article to Popular Magazine, to appear in
its January 1998 issue. In May 1998, you are using an online
database service to research a new article you are writing on
a similar topic. You type in your search terms, and, surprisel
There is your very own article, online. Popular Magazine, it
turns out, has sold the electronic publication rights to your
article, along with all 'the other articles published in the same
issue, to the online database service. Now you are paying a
fee to the online database service to read your own article!
You are irate, naturally. The on-line database service is
making money from your article. Popular Magazine made
money selling your article to the online database service. And
you are still a starving freelancer, trying to write another
article to pay the rent. What can you do? Can you sue
Popular Magazine or the online database service for copyright
infringement?
While your attorney promises to look into the matter for
you, you get back to work on the new article. This time, you
go to the public library and search on CD-ROMs for
information. Once again, your search terms pull up your very
own article for Popular Magazine. Neither Popular Magazine
nor the CD-ROM producer ever asked your permission or
paid you any money for the re-use of your article. Enraged,
you decide to visit Popular Magazine's website and then send
them a really hostile e-mail (against your lawyer's advice, of
course). What you find at their website, though, is yet
another way to read your article in the January issuel What,
hostile e-mail aside, can you do? Can you sue Popular
Magazine not only for selling your article to the online
database service but for selling to the CD-ROM producer and
for posting the article on its website? Can you also sue the
CD-ROM producer, the company that maintains the website
or the Internet service provider?
Now switch sides for a moment and imagine that you are
the publisher of Popular Magazine. In addition to publishing
an English edition in the United States, you also publish
German, French, and Dutch editions in Europe. You now
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wish to have the company that maintains your website post
all the articles from all the editions on the website so they will
be available globally to anyone who wishes to read them for a
fee. Furthermore, you would like to contract with an
electronic database service and with a CD-ROM
manufacturer to allow them to republish Popular Magazine,
the English edition as well as the foreign editions. The
database service will be available internationally and the CD-
ROM manufacturer will market its product through most of
the world. Having already paid the freelance journalists for
their articles once, you think you should not have to pay
them a second time. For one thing, there are so many of
them, that tracking them down and getting them to agree to
the republications would be time-consuming and difficult. For
another, the only reason the database service or CD-ROM
producer wants to republish the articles is that they were
first published in Popular Magazine. What they are paying for
is your magazine's name attached to the article. Can you go
ahead with your plans without fear of lawsuits? Will you be
treated the same way legally in the United States as in
Europe or need you worry about different legal troubles in
different countries?
This article will attempt to answer these questions by
looking at recent cases resolving disputes over the electronic
media rights of freelance journalists and publishers in the
United States and Europe. Part One of this article will
examine closely the first U.S. case to analyze electronic media
rights under § 20 1(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976,' Tasini v.
The New York Times Co. 2 Part Two will contrast the Tasini
decision with another very recent case, Ryan v. Carl Corp.,3
which also applied 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) but reached a different
conclusion. In Part Three, this article will compare the issues
raised by these two U.S. cases with four recent European
cases: Freelens v. Der Spiegee (Germany), Heg, Mulder & Stain
v. De Volkskrant (The Netherlands), General Association of
1. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
2. 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 192 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1999)
(opinion withdrawn at request of court).
3. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
4. Landgericht Hamburg Decision of the Regional Court of Hamburg,
August 19, 1997, translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, at 178-80.
5. Amsterdam District Court Third Multiple Chamber, Sept. 24, 1997,
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Professional Journalists of Belgium v. Central Station6
(Belgium), and Union of French Journalists v. SDV Plurimedid
(France). Finally, Part Four will consider the implications of
these conflicting decisions for international electronic trade in
copyrighted works and will suggest international solutions
that attempt to balance fairly the competing interests of
freelancers, publishers, and the new electronic media
industries.
I
Tasini v. The New York Times Co.
Section 201 of the 1976 Copyright Act establishes basic
principles of copyright ownership in the United States.8
Section 201(a) states that the source of copyright ownership
is the author of the work, or authors in the case of a joint
work.9 Sections 201(b) and 201(c) set out default rules (i.e.,
rules that apply only when not contracted out of expressly)
for copyright ownership in two special situations: works made
for hire and contributions to collective works. Section 201(b)
deems the employer for whom a work made for hire was
prepared to be the author of the work unless the parties have
contracted otherwise in writing.10 The U.S. cases involving the
electronic republication rights of journalists concern only
freelance journalists because all rights in the contributed
translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, at 181-89.
6. Association Generale des Journalistes Professionnels de Belgique v.
S.C.R.L. Cent. Station, High Court of Brussels, Oct. 10, 1996, and S.C.R.L.
Cent. Station v. Association Generale des Journalistes Professionnels de
Belgique, Court of Appeals of Brussels, Ninth Chamber, Civil Public Hearings,
Oct. 28, 1997, translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, at 191-97.
7. Union of French Journalists and National Syndicate of Journalists v.
SDV Plurimedia, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Strasbourg, Ordonnance de
Rf6r6 Commercial, [1998], translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, at
199-201.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994) ("Copyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint
work are co-owners of copyright in the work"). Id. "A joint work" is defined in 17
U.S.C. § 101 of the Copyright Act.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright."). Id. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines the
term "work made for hire." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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works of employee journalists would be owned by the
periodical that employs them. Section 201(c) clarifies the
rights of non-employee authors of contributed works. Section
201(c) also distinguishes their ownership rights in their
contributions from the rights of the copyright owner of the
collective work as a whole. The former, unless he or she has
expressly transferred rights, retains all rights in the
contributed work, except that the copyright owner of the
collective work has the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution under certain circumstances
specified in the statute:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work
is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole,
and vests initially in the author of the contribution. In the
absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work
is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of
that particular collective work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the same
series. "
Section 201(d) allows any of the rights belonging to the
copyright owner, enumerated in § 106, to be transferred and
owned separately.'2 However, the Copyright Act guards
against the possibility of inadvertent transfers of rights by
requiring in § 204(a) that a transfer of rights be in writing and
signed by the owner of the rights.'
3
Assuming the freelance journalist did not sign a contract
with the publisher expressly transferring the right to
republication of the article in electronic media or containing a
more general clause allowing future re-use of the article in
media not yet known,' 4 § 201(c) on its face appears to say
11. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
14. U.S. courts are divided in how they treat such open-ended "new
technology" clauses. See Platinum Record Co. Inc. v. Lucasfllm, Ltd., 566 F.
Supp. 226, 227 (D.N.J. 1983) (allowing defendants' release of film American
Graffiti on videocassettes where contract conferred right to exhibit film "by any
means or methods now or hereafter known"). See also Rooney v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211, 223, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (allowing
defendants right to sell videocassettes of films where contract granted right to
exhibit films "by any present or future methods or means" and by "any other
means now known or unknown.") But see Tele-Pac,: Inc. v. Grainger, 168 A.D.2d
11 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep't 1991) (holding that a 1964 contract granting right
to distribute films "for broadcasting by television or any other similar device
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that the publisher, without seeking further authorization
from the writer, can only republish the article in a revision or
a later issue of its magazine. Is a CD-ROM version of the
periodical a "revision"? What about the version included in
the online database? Can a revision of a collective work be in
a different medium than the original version? How different
may a later version be and still be a "revision" and not a new
(derivative) work?
The legislative history of § 201(c) offers little additional
guidance:
Under the language of [§ 201(c)] a publishing company
could reprint a contribution from one issue in a later issue
of its magazine, and could reprint an article from a 1980
edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it; the
publisher could not revise the contribution itself or include
it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or
other collective work.
Is a CD-ROM or online database service version of a print
magazine article "a new anthology," "an entirely different
magazine," or other "collective work?"
Until 1997, virtually no caselaw existed interpreting the
terms of § 201(c) or clarifying its relationship to new
electronic media. In that year, in Tasini v. The New York
Times Co.,' 6 Judge Sotomayor of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York undertook an
explication of § 201(c) in light of Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Serv. Co.' 7 and recent related caselaw on
copyrights in compilations. 18
The Tasini plaintiffs were six freelance writers who sold
now known or hereafter to be made known" did not extend to videocassette and
videodisc rights to the films).
15. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122-23 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5738.
16. 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 192 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1999)
(the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, was withdrawn at the
request of the court. A superseding opinion may be filed at a later date). The
district court opinion will hereinafter be referred to as 'Tasini I." The Second
Circuit opinion will be referred to as 'Tasini II." Judge Sotomayer has since
been elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
17. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
18. See, e.g., Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); CCC Info.
Servs. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994); Key
Publications. Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters. Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1991); Nestor's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 22:29
ELECTRONIC MEDIA RIGHTS
articles for publication in The New York Times, Newsday, and
Sports Illustrated.19 The publishers of these periodicals,
defendants The New York Times Co., Newsday, Inc., and
Time, Inc., sold - to two electronic service providers,
defendants LEXIS/NEXIS and UMI, the right to reproduce
their newspapers and magazines in online electronic
databases and on CD-ROMs.2 0 Plaintiffs alleged that by
allowing NEXIS and UMI to publish electronic versions of
periodicals containing their articles without first obtaining
their permission, the periodicals' publishers and the
electronic service providers infringed the copyright each
writer held in his or her individual articles.21 The defendant
publishers, in return, argued that the electronic database
and CD-ROM versions of the periodicals were permissible
"revisions" of collective works under § 201(c), one of the
privileges that § 201(c) gives to the owner of copyright in the
collective work.22
First, Judge Sotomayor determined that the freelance
writers had not expressly transferred electronic rights in their
articles.23 The court found no express transfer of rights
through legends on the back of checks issued to plaintiffs in
payment for their articles.24 And the court rejected Time,





23. See id. at 810-12.
24. See id. at 811. The court found there to be no express transfer of rights
through the check legends for two reasons: they were not timely and they were
ambiguous. See id. The defendant had already sent plaintiffs' articles to NEXIS
before plaintiffs had received or cashed the checks. See id. at 810. The writing
on the back of the checks stated that defendant had the "right to include
[plaintiffs' articles] in electronic library archives." Id. The court found that
phrase ambiguous because "electronic data base" could mean either a
computerized in-house storage system without commercial purpose or a
commercial data base like that of NEXIS. See id. at 811. See also Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 564 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a check
legend providing for the "assignment... of all right, title, and interest" was
ambiguous, and failed to effectively transfer copyright); Papa's-June Music, Inc.
v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("neither the royalty
checks nor the attached royalty statements mention a transfer of copyright
ownership."); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F. Supp.
153, 162 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("the checks submitted by MBI, which do not
contain any explanatory notations besides 'Picasso royalties,' are not convincing
proof, to say the least, of the alleged oral agreement.").
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Inc.'s contention that "first publication" rights, which
plaintiffs admittedly did transfer, include the right first to
publish an article in any and all mediums; in doing so, the
court declined to view the dispute as a new-media issue, that
is, as a dispute over whether the electronic media uses were
known at the time that the freelancers granted rights in their
contributed works to the publishers.
25. See id. at 811-12. Time's argument was based on new-media cases such
as Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968) and
Boume v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
1890 (1996). These cases involved disputes over the scope of licenses which
were limited by their terms to a particular medium. The issue in these cases
was whether new uses developed at a later time fell within the license's grant of
rights in a specific medium. Bartsch held that the licensee is entitled to any
uses that may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in the
license and that the burden of framing and negotiating an exception should fall
on the grantor. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155. Thus, in Bartsch, the right to
exhibit a motion picture was held to include the right to exhibit the movie on
television. See id. In Boume, the court held that motion picture rights could
include videocassette rights. See Bourne, 68 F.3d at 630. See also Boosey &
Hawkes Music Publ's., Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577 (2d Cir.
1998) (reviews prior case law and concludes that "new-use analysis should rely
on neutral principles of contract interpretation rather than solicitude for either
party."). But see Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a license conferring right to exhibit film on television
did not include right to distribute videocassettes of film because new media was
unknown at time of license, because television and videocassette display "have
very little in common," and because the contract lacked a "new technology"
clause). The Tasini I court found the Bartsch line of cases inapposite because
they did not involve contracts imposing specific temporal limitations such as
"first publication rights" as did the contracts of the freelance-journalist plaintiffs
in Tasini L See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp at 812. Thus, where the Bartsch line of
cases concerned contracts with media limitations, the contracts in Tasini I did
not have media restrictions, only temporal limitations (right to first publication
only).
The Tasini I court resolved its freelancer-publisher dispute through
interpretation of the Copyright Act, rather than through contract interpretation
as in Bartsch. Nevertheless, the Tasini I court engaged in a related type of new-
use argument when it rejected plaintiffs' contentions that a § 201(c) "revision"
either is limited to the medium in which the work first appeared or could not
have been intended by Congress to extend to electronic databases when it
drafted § 201(c) in the 1970s. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
New-media/new-use arguments were also significant in some of the
European cases to be discussed in this paper, including the German case,
Freelens v. Der Spiegel (see text p. 49) and the Dutch case, Heg, Mulder & Stain
v. De Volkskrant (see text p. 50). The resolution of new-use disputes and the
treatment of "future technology" clauses in copyright licenses varies greatly
from one country to another. See Herman Cohen Jehoram, "Netherlands," §
4[l][a][ii], and Adolf Dietz, "Germany, Federal Republic," § 4[21[a] in 2 NIMMER &
GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE (Paul Edward Geller, eds.,
1997); see also 1 NIMMER & GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE
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Having found no express transfer giving the owners of the
collective works rights beyond the § 201(c) "privileges," the
court was left to struggle with the meaning of those
"privileges" and whether the periodical publishers and
electronic service providers stepped beyond them, infringing
the copyrights of the individual writers.26 Plaintiffs first
argued that the § 201(c) privileges are nontransferable,
nonexclusive licenses, so that even if the electronic versions
were permissible revisions, the periodical publishers, without
the journalists' permission, could not transfer to the
electronic service provider the right to publish such a
revision.27 Not surprisingly, this argument was rejected by the
court which held that § 201 (c) privileges are transferable and
that publishers can contract with others to produce
permissible revisions of their collective works. 28  Next,
plaintiffs argued that the § 201(c) privileges are limited to the
same medium in which the collective work originally
appeared. 29 The court also rejected this argument, finding no
evidence in the statute, its legislative history, or in the
revisions that supports such an interpretation. ° In fact, as
the court pointed out, microfilm editions of defendants'
periodicals have long existed and plaintiffs never objected
even though microfilm is certainly a different medium than
print.3'
In a third attempt to persuade the court to read the §
201(c) privileges narrowly, plaintiffs argued that the privileges
do not extend to public display rights granted in 17 U.S.C. §
106(5).32 Thus, even if defendants may revise the periodicals
§ 6[2][a] (Melville B. Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller, eds., 1997).
26. See d. at 814.
27. See id. at 815-16.
28. See id. Plaintiffs argued that § 201(d) provides only for transfer of
"rights" not "privileges." See id. The court noted that § 201(d) allows transfer of
subdivisions of rights and that the privileges in § 201(c) are a kind of
subdivision of an ownership right. See Ad. The court also noted that Congress's
intent in drafting § 201(c)- to repudiate the concept of copyright
indivisibility- would not in any way be served by restricting publishers' ability
to contract with others to produce versions of their collective works. See id.
29. See id. at 816.
30. See id.
31. See d. at 816 n.7.
32. See Ad. at 816. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act lists the six
exclusive rights that form the "bundle" of rights constituting a copyright. See id.
See also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 106(5), which protects the exclusive
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containing the plaintiffs' contributions, defendants cannot
display the revised collective work on a computer screen
without an express transfer of this right.33 Again the court
rejected plaintiffs' argument, and again, it was the long-
standing practice of permitting microfilm versions of
periodicals to go unchallenged that helped defeat it.34 If
microfilm versions do not infringe display rights by exceeding
the scope of § 201(c) rights, why would computer versions?
35
More generally, the court pointed to the meaning that the
1976 Copyright Act gives to "publication. "36 In § 101,
"publication" is defined as "offering to distribute copies ... for
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or
public display", and it includes a broad, forward-looking
definition of "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work
is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived."37 From such
definitions, the court found that the § 201(c) privilege to
"reproduce" and "distribute" revised versions of the collective
work includes "any incidental display of those individual
contributions. ,38
Plaintiffs directed their remaining arguments to the crux
of Tasini: whether LEXIS/NEXIS's electronic versions and
UMI's CD-ROM versions of defendants' collective works are §
201(c) "revisions" of those works.39 Plaintiffs argued that the
"revisions" contemplated by the drafters of the 1976
Copyright Act did not extend to versions created by new
technologies." They also argued that the 1976 Act did not
contemplate that "revisions" might mean significant
alterations in the format of the original collective work.4 1 Even
if the 1976 Act could be construed to allow the possibility of
electronic revisions of collective works, plaintiffs argued,
right "to display the copyrighted work publicly," applies to literary, pictorial and
graphic works and the individual images of movies or other audiovisual works.
17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994).
33. See Tasini 1, 972 F. Supp. at 816.
34. See id. at 816, 816 n. 8.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 816.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
38. Tasini 1, 972 F. Supp. at 817.
39. See d. at 819.
40, See i. at 817-18.
41, See i.
[VOL. 22:29
these electronic versions were not revisions because they
dealt in the separate individual contributions, not in the
collective works as a whole, and because so much of what
was distinctive to these collective works- photographs,
captions, page layouts-was missing in the electronic
versions .
The court responded to all these arguments with a very
broad reading of the term "revision."43 Emphasizing that §
201(c) says "any revision," and that the drafters of the 1976
Copyright Act were well aware of emerging new technologies
and created the Act with media neutrality in mind, the court
found that "any revision" could be an electronic revision.44
To determine whether these electronic versions of The
New York Times, Newsday, and Sports Illustrated were
revisions of the collective works in which the individual works
were first published and not new works, the court relied on
Feist45and its progeny46 to analyze the collective works as
compilations whose copyrightable originality lay with the
selection and arrangement of the contributing works .47 Thus,
the court asked whether the electronic version preserved a
"defining original element" of the collective work.4 ' Although
the court acknowledged that the periodicals' arrangements of
the individual contributions were lost in the electronic
versions' omission of page layout, photos, ads, and captions,
it found that the publisher defendants' original selection of
articles was preserved electronically because:
Articles appear in the disputed data bases solely because
the defendant publishers earlier made the editorial
determination that those articles would appeal to
readers .... Those technologies copy all of the articles
which are selected to appear in each daily or weekly issue
42. See id. at 821.
43. See id. at 820.
44. See id. at 821-22.
45. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
46. See, e.g., Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); CCC Info.
Servs. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994); Key
Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters. Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1991); Nestor's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
47. See Tasini 1, 972 F. Supp. at 822-23.
48. See id. at 825.
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of The New York Times or Newsday or Sports Illustrated.49
Further, no intervening selection of articles was made by
UMI or NEXIS that might cause the electronic versions to
become "new" collective works.5 0 That the contributions are
stored alongside thousands of other articles from other
periodicals does not undermine the continued existence of
the publishers' "selections" because this "immersion into a
larger database" is countered by mechanisms reinforcing the
connections between the plaintiffs' articles and the hard copy
periodicals in which they first appeared.5 Thus, someone
using NEXIS could access an article through a data base (or
"library") identified by the periodical.5 2 Once the user accesses
an article, it appears tagged with the periodical's name as
well as the issue and page number of the hard copy version of
the article. 3 This reinforced connection to defendant
publishers' periodicals is what gives the articles their value
according to the court: "[a]n article appearing in Newsday or
The New York Times is instantly imbued with a certain degree
of credibility that might not exist in the case of an article
never published, or an article published in other
periodicals.""
Finally, plaintiffs argued that so much of the original
collective work was missing, and the electronic versions
therefore were so drastically different from the hard copy
periodicals, that the electronic versions could not be
considered "revisions."5 Again, the court read "any revision"
to include even revisions with significant alterations. It held
that here, although the arrangement of the collective works
was lost, the retained selection was enough to make the
electronic use of the articles recognizable as versions and
therefore § 201(c) "revisions" of the defendant publishers'
newspapers and magazines."
As if the court were not quite confident of its rationale for
this holding, in the conclusion of its opinion it made a final
49. Id. at 823.
50. See id. at n. 13.
51. Id. at 823-24.
52. See id. at 824.
53. See id.
54. d. atn. 14.
55. See id. at 824.
56. See id. at 824-25.
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effort to bolster its holding by turning once again to the Feist-
derived compilation analysis. 7 This time, the court borrowed
the "substantial similarity" test used in compilation
infringement cases. 58 Because substantial similarity may exist
where original selection is copied even without original
arrangement, the court reasoned that an electronic version of
a periodical could be a "revision" as it is "substantially
similar" in this sense. 9 However, the court did stop short of
claiming the "substantial similarity" test as a fixed rule to
demonstrate the existence of a § 20 1 (c) "revision."60 Instead, it
supplemented "substantial similarity" with a similarity-of-
function test, asking whether the electronic versions served
the "same basic function" as newspapers and magazines.6'
The court found that they did: "they are all sources of
information on the assorted topics selected by those editors
working for the publisher defendant.
6 2
57. See id. at 825-26.
58. See id. at 825 ("[A] work that copies either the original selection or the
original arrangement of a protected compilation is 'substantially similar' ... for
copyright purposes."); see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publishing Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991).
59. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 825.
60. See id. "[Tihe Court does not mean to declare a fixed rule by which a
revision of a particular collective work is created any time an original selection
or arrangement is preserved in a subsequent creation. In certain
circumstances, it is possible that the resulting work might be so different in
character from 'that collective work' which preceded it that it cannot fairly be
deemed a revision." Id. Here, however, the defendants did "more than merely
preserve a defining element of the publishers' collective works." Id. Their
electronic versions "serve[d] the same basic function." Id.
61. See id.
62. Id. A new anthology, which the House Report on § 201(c) specified as an
example of what is not a revision and therefore what a publisher could not do
with the individual contributions to its collective work, is likely to pass both the
substantial similarity test and the basic function test. See H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 122-23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5738. An anthology of
American sports writing might include most of the articles from a particular
issue of Sports Illustrated. Thus, the periodical's original selection would be
preserved, and possibly some of the arrangement of the works in the periodical
too, satisfying the substantial similarity test. And arguably a reader would
consult the anthology seeking the same information as the reader would seek in
Sports Illustrated, thus satisfying the basic function test. But the new anthology
would still not be a revision according to the House Report, or according to
one's ordinary, everyday understanding of the distinction between a revision
and a new anthology. In fact, the new anthology/revision distinction might
serve as a better gauge than the basic function test of when a new version has
gone beyond a mere revision. Thus, CD-ROMs of a single periodical's back
issues would look less like a new anthology (and more like a revision) than
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Was the court right in Tasini 1? Common sense might
suggest not. Certainly the NEXIS or CD-ROM version of a
magazine article is not what most people probably mean
when they talk about a "revision" of a magazine. Also, the
decision seems quite unfair to the freelance journalists who
are not compensated when their works are re-exploited by the
electronic publishers.6 It seems especially unfair to the
freelance authors considering that § 201(c) was drafted to
protect the rights of authors in their contributions to
collective works by limiting the rights of publishers of
collective works. 4
Legally, the court is correct in its analysis of what is
NEXIS's computer database of hundreds of different periodicals, which looks
much more like a new anthology than a revised version of a particular
periodical. What makes the new anthology distinct is the context in which the
contributed works appear: physically in the context of works from other
periodicals, and conceptually in the context of works brought together under a
different unifying idea (no longer an issue of Sports Illustrated, for example, but
an anthology of American sports writing). One might be able to manipulate the
basic function test to get at that same contextual distinction, depending on how
one defines basic function, but this just shows how amorphous (and therefore
unpredictable in application) "basic function" is as a concept.
63. See Alice Haemmerli, Commentary: Tasini v. New York Times Co., 22
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 148 (1998) ("[I]ndividual authors' contributions
are disseminated online to millions of users, despite the fact that the authors
have never agreed to transfer their electronic publishing rights. While the
electronic publisher is well paid by its customers, and the original publisher is
well compensated by the electronic publisher, the authors receive nothing.
Moreover, they lose future, as well as present, benefit because their prospective
ability to license their works is severely compromised by the works' prior
distribution to millions of readers or viewers."). So, perhaps in addition to
context as a standard to judge whether a version is a "revision" (context both
physically and conceptually, as in the "new anthology" test discussed supra
note 62), there should be a commercial-similarity test. A version with a vastly
different commercial role or potential would not be a revision. This test would
allow a court to distinguish between microfilm editions of a periodical and
electronic-media versions. Another criterion for distinguishing a revision from a
new use is suggested by the court in Cohen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.; the
court distinguished the new medium (videocassettes) from the medium in which
use was licensed (television) based on the nature of public access to the work in
the different media. See 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988). Access to videocassettes
was far freer and "virtually unlimited" while televised exhibits of the film were
constrained by the broadcasting networks. See id. at 853-54. Perhaps a similar
distinction could be made between print and electronic versions of periodicals;
nature-of-public-access might work as a criterion to distinguish a revision from
a new use. A nature-of-public-access criterion would also allow a distinction
between microfilm and electronic databases. Clearly a test for "revision" ought
to be multi-factored.
64. See Tasini 1, 972 F. Supp. at 815; see also 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01 [A] at 10-5 (1996).
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protected originality in a compilation (including a collective
work), but this Feist-derived analysis is not sufficient to
determine what a § 201(c) "revision" might be. Further the
court fails to offer any additional standards beyond the
nebulous "same basic function" test65 to judge when an
electronic version of a print periodical might or might not be a
"revision." Certainly what is original about a collective work is
its arrangement and selection of the underlying
contributions. But even if that selection is preserved in the
electronic versions, that fact alone does not make them
"revisions." The "substantial similarity" standard is too broad
to help here. Used elsewhere as a mechanism to protect
copyright owners' rights by sweeping in as much as possible
under the rubric of infringement, and thus preventing
plagiarists from escaping by immaterial variations,
"substantial similarity" seems like the wrong tool to use to
protect authors' rights in contributions to collective works. A
test that narrowed the category of permissible "revision"
would better serve that purpose, a purpose which was the
stated goal of Congress in drafting § 201 (c).
What drove the court to a decision so contrary to
common-sense and so inimical to authors' rights? The court
even seemed uneasy with its own decision, reaching far afield
for the "substantial similarity" test to justify its reading of §
201(c)'s "revision," and further acknowledging that its holding
may be inequitable to the journalists ("Congress is of course
free to revise [§ 201(c)] to achieve a more equitable result"').
One clue to the court's motive may be the opinion's
understatement of the commercial nature of NEXIS's and
UMI's electronic publications: the court pays little attention to
the fact that while the freelance journalists receive no further
compensation for their works, the hard copy publishers sell
those works to the electronic publishers for large sums of
money, and the electronic service providers in turn make
enormous profits from user fees. Instead, the court likened
these electronic commercial enterprises to "electronic
research libraries],"67 asserting that they "serve the same
basic function as newspapers and magazines; they are all
65. See Tasini 1, 972 F. Supp. at 825.
66. Id. at 827.
67. Id. at 825 n.16.
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sources of information on the assorted topics." 8 Bordering on
praise for the electronic defendants and revealing more than
a little bias, the court noted that the electronic publications
not only serve the same archival, information-providing
function as the print periodicals, they do it better:
"permit[ting] users to consult defendants' periodicals in new
ways and with new efficiency."6 9 It is as if the court had taken
the perspective of the NEXIS users and was supporting their
right to access to the newspaper and magazine articles. A fair
use argument lurks, as if the court were really valuing the
public's need for access to information (in the form of
plaintiffs' articles) higher than the individual freelancers'
rights, not to mention fearing that the permission requests
and payments to individual freelancers would hinder the
growth of these new, more efficient technologies. Contrary to
its own assertion that the 1976 Copyright Act was forward
looking in its adaptability to new computer technologies, 70 the
court seemed to say that Congress will need to rewrite §
201(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act if it wants to preserve the
rights of freelance journalists in the computer age.71
In September 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in a unanimous panel decision written by
Chief Judge Ralph Winter Jr., overruled the district court,
rejecting its broad interpretation of the § 201(c) revision
privilege.72 Emphasizing how much of the publishers' original
contributions to their collective works, in terms of selection,
coordination, and arrangement, were lost in the electronic
NEXIS and UMI versions, and how much of what remained of
value was the preexisting material belonging to the individual
freelance authors, the Second Circuit viewed the electronic
databases as more like "new anthologies" than "revisions" of
the periodicals. 73 The court declared:
[Tihere is no feature peculiar to the databases at issue...
that would cause us to review them as "revisions." NEXIS is
a database comprising thousands or millions of individually
retrievable articles taken from hundreds or thousands of
periodicals. It can hardly be deemed a "revision" of each
68. Id. at 825.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 818.
71. See id. at 827.
72. See 192 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1999), withdrawn.
73. See id.
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edition of every periodical that it contains.74
Furthermore, the court saw no relevant distinction
between image-based CD-ROMs and text-based NEXIS, nor
between electronic databases of multiple editions of many
periodicals, finding them all to be "new anthologies" not
"revisions."75 In a footnote, the Second Circuit criticized the
district court's application of a "substantial similarity" test.
76
That test, the Second Circuit pointed out, applies where two
compilation authors are contesting rights to their
compilations, where what is at stake is not the underlying
factual material which neither author owns but the selection,
coordination, and arrangement contributed by the
compilation author.7 7 The ability of the New York Times to
protect its original selection, coordination, and arrangement
is not compromised by the authors' retained rights in their
individual contributions.78
Whether a newspaper's website, with links to more than
one day's edition, would be a § 201(c) "revision" remains an
open question after the Second Circuit's decision. So too is
the question of whether, through either U.S. Supreme Court
interpretation or Congressional amendments, the Copyright
Act should be retooled for an electronic age, with, perhaps, a
scheme for collective licensing of the kind proposed by
Plaintiff Tasini, who is now president of the National Writers'
Union.79
II
Ryan v. Carl Corp.
The only other U.S. case focusing on the interpretation of
§201(c) is the very recent Ryan v. Carl Corp.8 ° This case






79. See Simon J. Frankel, Get Me Rewrite!, IP WORLDWIDE (Nov. 1999)
<http://www.ipww.com/monthly/99-nov/frankel.html>.
80. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998). In contrast, another very recent
case, Greenberg v. National Geographic Soc'y., No. 97-3924-CIV-LEARD, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18060 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 1998), followed Tasini I, denying a
freelance photographer compensation for the electronic redistribution of his
contributions to the National Geographic Society's magazine.
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by freelance authors against "UnCover," a document retrieval
and delivery service owned by defendants Carl Corporation
and Dialog Corporation.8 The business consisted of an
Internet database listing the titles of approximately eight
million articles from seventeen thousand periodicals.82
Customers searched the database by title, author, periodical
title, and subject.83 If the customer wished to receive a full-
text copy of the article, UnCover sent an employee to the
library to photocopy the article and then fax it to the
customer for a fee.84 In some instances, UnCover sought the
publisher's permission and sent a copyright payment either
to the publisher or to a copyright-payment clearinghouse.85
But the service did not ask permission of the articles' authors
86nor offer to pay them copyright fees.
Where the Tasini dispute centered on the meaning of §
201(c)'s "any revision," the UnCover controversy revolved
around the meaning of § 201(c)'s "as part," in the phrase "the
owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing
the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any
revision of that collective work, and any later collective work
in the same series. ' The freelance authors argued that
UnCover's copying of individual articles was not reproducing
them "as part" of collective works.88 The defendants argued
that as long as they reproduced the original work (the "part")
as it appeared in the collective work, they did not need
anyone's permission other than that of the owner of the
copyright in the collective work who holds the right to
reproduce the work in this fashion under § 201(c).89 Unlike
81. See Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. See also Joanna Glasner, Freelance Reporters Sue Article Search
Service, LAW JOURNAL EXTRA! (Website of NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL) (Oct.
31, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles/freelance.html>. At the time of
publication, the NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL URL was inactive. However, this
article is available at <http://www.google.com> (visited Sept. 24, 1999) (search
for records containing "Joanna Hasner").
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994), emphasis added.
88. See Ryan v. Carl, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
89. See id.
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Tasini I, the Ryan court interpreted the language of § 201(c)
and its legislative history to mean that doubts should be
resolved in favor of authors rather than publishers: "[Clourts
should construe the rights of publishers narrowly rather than
broadly in relation to those of authors .... When
determining the respective rights of publishers and authors
under § 201(c), one must bear in mind that Congress passed
the section to enlarge the rights of authors.""° The court,
while not rejecting Tasini, just notes its inapplicability to the
UnCover facts. 9' Here, no one claimed UnCover was "revising"
the collective works when they sold copies of individual
articles.92 Of course, the photocopies retained some of the
arrangement of the original collective work, including layout,
photographs, and captions, but "[clalling the reproduction of
a single article a 'revision' of a collected work ... is more
strained than even a flexible interpretation can withstand."
93
Interestingly, where the Tasini I court, in holding for the
defendant publishers, suggested its decision might be
inequitable for plaintiffs, the Ryan court, while finding for the
plaintiff authors, worried that its decision was inequitable for
publishers. "4 If authors hold the right to reproduce (or allow
others to reproduce) their individual contributions to
collective works in most situations, the authors seem to be
getting a windfall in the form of all the value added by the
publisher though its inclusion of the article in its collective
90. Id. at 1151. Section 201(c) was enacted as part of the 1976 Copyright
Act in response to the doctrine of copyright indivisibility. Under this doctrine,
individual authors of contributions to collective works risked inadvertently
giving up all of their rights in the contribution either to the publisher or to the
public. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 815. Section 201(c) was intended to "clarify
and improve the present confused and frequently unfair legal situation with
respect to rights in contributions" by "preservling] the author's copyright in a
contribution even if the contribution does not bear a separate notice in the
author's name, and without requiring any unqualified transfer of rights to the
owner of the collective work." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122-23 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5738. The term "privilege" in § 201(c) was meant
to emphasize that the publishers- the creators of the collective works- are
limited in how they can use the individual contributions, limited to exercising
those few rights or privileges that they possess. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at
816.
91. See Ryan, 23 F.Supp. 2d at 1151.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 1151.
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work.95 For example, where the collective work is a peer-
reviewed academic journal, "the article gains intellectual
credibility from having been selected and approved by the
publisher. To be useful to future researchers, the article must
be cited according to its location in the publisher's journal. In
some magazines, the publisher's addition of illustrations adds
substantially to the value of the article."96
The broader societal significance of striking the right
computer-age balance between publishers' and authors'
rights, implicit in Tasini I's concern for NEXIS and CD-ROM
users, is addressed in Ryan v. Carl Corp.9 7 Claiming
(ironically) to be as bound by Congressional intent and §
201(c)'s statutory language in its holding for authors as the
Tasini I court did in holding for publishers, the Ryan court
noted that "[from the standpoint of societal efficiency, it
makes more sense to allocate the right of reproduction to
publishers, because publishers are easier to locate...
academic use of articles will be made more difficult by the
adoption of plaintiffs' construction [of § 201(c)], which will




Given the difficulties U.S. courts have faced in balancing
the rights of publishers of collective works, author-
contributors, and the information needs of an increasingly
computer-literate, computer-wired nation, it should be no
surprise that international courts are just as divided over
how best to strike the balance. The remainder of this paper
will look at four recent cases in Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France that struggle to resolve disputes over
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1150.
98. Id. A different societal-efficiency concern is raised in Itar-Tass Russian
News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 93 (2d Cir. 1998). Who is
better able to protect the contributed works from infringement, the publisher or
the individual authors? If the publisher, because of its limited rights in the
collective work, can only sue for infringement of the selection, coordination or
arrangement of the collective work, can infringers avoid such suits by, for
example, altering the arrangement of the works they copy? Will infringers be
deterred by the threat of suits by individual authors of contributed works?
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the electronic publishing rights of journalist-contributors to
print periodicals. After describing the outcome of each case,
this paper will attempt to account for the differences in the
decisions and will consider the potential consequences of
those differences for international commerce in artistic and
literary works, especially via the Internet or CD-ROM
products.
A. Germany
The 1997 German case, Freelens v. Der Spiegel,99 involved
a dispute between freelance photographers and the producer
of annual CD-ROM compilations of the magazine Der Spiegel.
The CD-ROMs contained the full text and illustrations from
the print editions, including plaintiffs' photographs. °° Under
German copyright law transfer of copyright is impossible and
no work-for-hire rule exists, but the creator of the work can
grant "use rights" or licenses. ' Because the photographers
had not expressly granted permission for the creation of
electronic versions of their works, the central issue was
whether an implied license had been granted.' 2 To decide
that issue, the court had to determine whether or not the
electronic version was a novel use unknown at the time of
granting the license. 10 3 It held that in 1989 when the licenses
were first granted, CD-ROMs were a known use, even if the
commercial significance of that use was not then fully
apparent.0 4 Furthermore, the court, like the court in Tasini I,
did not see a significant difference between the older
microfilm compilations of Der Spiegel, to which the plaintiffs
never objected, and the CD-ROM version. 0 5 So, again like the
Tasini I court, the German court held for the defendant
99. Landgericht Hamburg, Decision of the Regional Court of Hamburg,
August 19, 1997, translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 178-80
(1998).
100. See id. at 178.
101. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Electronic Rights and Wrongs in Germany and
the Netherlands, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 151, 152 (1998).
102. See Landgericht Hamburg, Decision of the Regional Court of Hamburg,
August 19, 1997, translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 178-80
(1998).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 179-80.
105. See id. at 179.
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publisher. °' It did not appear to concern the court that the
CD-ROM version represented commercial potential of an
order unthinkable for microfilm, or made plaintiffs'
photographs vastly more accessible than the microfilm
version of Der Spiegel. What did concern it, however, was the
possibility that a ruling requiring CD-ROM producers to
obtain permissions and make payments to individual
contributing journalists would impede economic and
technical progress, creating obstacles to the development of
new electronic technologies. °7
B. The Netherlands
The other three European cases, in contrast, were all pro-
freelance-author decisions. In the 1997 Dutch case, Heg,
Mulder & Stam v. De Volkskrant,'0 8 the plaintiffs were
freelance journalists whose suit had the support of the
Netherlands Association of Journalists, the main labor union
representing employee and freelance journalists. 9  The
defendant, De Volkskrant, was one of the Netherlands largest
newspaper publishers.' 0  Plaintiffs argued that their
106. See id. at 178. An interesting difference to note here between the two
cases and the two countries' legal systems: in the U.S., whether rights were
transferred for new media is treated as a contractual issue, and because the
Tasini I court framed the publisher-freelancer dispute as a matter of copyright-
statute construction, it distinguished the Bartsch line of new-media cases. In
Germany, whether rights were transferred for new media is treated as a
copyright issue; applying German copyright law, the Freelens court considered
whether the new media were known at the time the license was granted and
found that they were. For further discussion on the differences between U.S.
and German treatments of rights transference for new-media, see generally 2
NIMMER & GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 411 ][a] [iiI (Paul
Edward Geller ed., 1998). See also the Tasini I court's discussion of the Bartsch
line of new-media cases, supra note 25.
107. See Landgerich Hamburg, Decision of the Regional Court of Hamburg,
August 19, 1997, translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 179. "In the
opinion of the Court, this view corresponds with the tendency in the decisions
of the Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court] not to make great demands with
regard to the requirement of 'known means' in the sense of section 31(4) of the
Copyright Act. For example, for direct satellite transmissions and terrestrial
transmissions the Bundesgerichtshof pointed out that section 31(4) of the
Copyright Act with its strict legal consequence of invalidity shall not hinder the
economic and technical progress of the exploitation of works through the
development of new, independently licensable means of utilization." Id.
108. Amsterdam District Court Third Multiple Chamber 24 (September 1997),
translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 179 (1998).
109. See Hugenholtz, supra note 101, at 155.
110. See id.
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copyrights were infringed by De Volkskrant's re-use of their
contributions in its quarterly CD-ROM compilations and on
its Internet website."' Unlike Germany, but more like the
U.S. and most European countries, the Netherlands allows
for transfer of copyright, either in full or in part.' 2 The
Netherlands also permits authors to retain their moral rights
even after transferring their copyright in a work."13 Finally,
Dutch law allows for licenses granting rights in the
copyrighted work, and these licenses may be oral, implied by
conduct, or written."1
4
The plaintiffs argued that, without any express contracts,
what they granted by implied license to the newspaper were
only one-time print rights, not the right to re-use their works
in electronic media."' The defendant publisher countered
with a microfilm argument like the one seen in Tasini I and
Freelens, claiming that the CD-ROMs and website served the
same archival function as the earlier microfilm versions and
that the plaintiffs never objected to the microfilm re-use of
their works."'
In holding for the plaintiff journalists, the Dutch court
found that the differences between the print newspaper and
its CD-ROM and website versions were too extensive to treat
the electronic versions as merely substitutes for microfilm or
paper archives."17 Rather, the court held that the electronic
versions represent independent means of reproduction and
publication requiring separate permissions from the
journalist-contributors."'. Also, the court found that the
electronic uses were not foreseeable in the 1980s when
plaintiffs originally granted licenses to the newspaper.119
111. See Amsterdam District Court Third Multiple Chamber 24 (September
1997), translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, at 184.
112. See Hugenholtz, supra note 101, at 156.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 157.
115. See Amsterdam District Court Third Multiple Chamber 24 (September
1997), translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 184.
116. See id. at 184-85.
117. See id. at 185-188.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 187. The Dutch court seemed to apply a combination of
copyright and contract law to resolve the new-media issue. Article 2(2) of the
Dutch Copyright Code calls for a restrictive interpretation of copyright transfer,
limiting the scope of a transfer of rights to those specifically mentioned in the
contract or necessarily implied by the nature or purpose of the agreement. See
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Interestingly, the defendants in the Dutch case tried to
play on the same fears of impeding progress in new
technology that were factors in the German and U.S. (Tasini 1)
courts' pro-defendant decisions.' Here, the defendant argued
that because the CD-ROM and website were both "in an
experimental stage"121 and "running at a loss, '22 the plaintiffs
were unreasonable to demand compensation and permission-
requests. 23 Unlike the Freelens and Tasini courts, the De
Volkskrant court was far more concerned with the
unauthorized worldwide distribution of plaintiffs'
contributions via Internet and CD-ROMs than it was with the
possibility that protecting authors' rights would interfere with




The 1996 Belgian case, General Association of
Professional Journalists v. Central Station, 2 ' was another win
for plaintiffs, here both freelance and employee journalists.
The plaintiffs sued Central Station, a consortium of ten
Belgian periodical publishers who operated a website through
which fee-paying users could access the plaintiffs' articles.26
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants infringed their
copyright because they did not authorize the licensing of their
Hugenholtz, supra note 101, at 157. Article 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code is an
imprevision rule allowing dissolution of a contract if unforeseen circumstances
(e.g., new-media uses) no longer justify continuing the contract under its
original terms. See id. Interestingly, Dutch copyright law has a special provision
for new modes of exploitation of a film work. If the new modes did not exist or
were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the film was produced, the producer
or his assignee owe equitable remuneration to the film's authors (any person
making a creative contribution to the film). See Herman Cohen Jehoram,
"Netherlands," 2 NIMMER & GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4[1][a][ii] (Paul Edward Geller ed., 1998). Compare supra notes 25 and 107, on
U.S. and German treatments of rights transference for new media.
120. See Amsterdam District Court Third Multiple Chamber 24 (September
1997), translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 184-85.
121. Id. at 185.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 185-188.
125. Association Generale des Journalistes Professionnels de Belgique v.
S.C.R.L. Central Station [1996], High Court of Brussels, translated in 22
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, 191.
126. See id. at 191.
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articles by the individual periodical publishers to the third-
party (consortium) website. 1 '
Under Belgian copyright law, there is no works-made-for-
hire provision, but there is a presumption that employees
have transferred publication rights to the employer
periodicals.1 28 The presumption is limited, however, to
publication rights falling within the scope of the employment
relati onship.'29 The court found that the newspapers, by
giving Central Station permission to republish their articles
on its website, exceeded the scope of the presumed employee
grant of rights. 3 ' The court based its holding on the
significant degree of difference it found between the print and
website versions, particularly the fact that the website made
the journalists' works accessible to a global audience. 3 ' As for
the freelance journalists, the court held that Central Station
needed to obtain their written permission to license the
website's republication of their work, and since no such
written agreement existed, the defendants infringed plaintiffs'
copyrights.'32
The Central Station decision was appealed the following
year, in 1997, and the appellate court upheld the decision for
plaintiffs but based its holding for the employee journalists
on different reasoning. 33 According to the appellate court, the
oral agreement between the employee-journalists and the
employer-periodicals created an intuitu personae contractual
relationship, meaning they had contracted specifically with
and toward each other and they could not assign their
obligations to a third party, the consortium running the
127. See id. at 191-192
128. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Electronic Rights in Belgium and France: General
Association of Professional Journalists of Belgium v. Central Station (Brussels
Court of First Instance, October 16, 1996; Brussels Court of Appeals, October 28,
1997); Union of French Journalists v. SDV Plurimedia (Strasbourg Court of
Grand Instance, February 3, 1998)22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 161 (1998).
129. See id.
130. See Association Generale des Journalistes Professionnels de Belgique v.
S.C.R.L. Central Station, High Court of Brussels [19961, translated in 22
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, at 193-94.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See S.C.R.L. Central Station v. Association Generale des Journalistes
Professionnels de Belgique [19971, Court of Appeals of Brussels, Ninth




website.'34 Both the appellate and lower courts in the Belgian
case seemed particularly concerned with the journalists'
ability to control the context of their works' publication (i.e.,
with what other articles and newspapers they wish to be
ideologically affiliated) and to control the choice of audience
(i.e., the specific segment of the public that their periodical
reaches as opposed to the vastly larger and possibly
ideologically unsympathetic public accessing the works
through the consortium's website).
1 35
D. France
Finally, in the 1998 French case, Union of French
Journalists v. SDV Plurimedia,3 8 the court found for the
plaintiffs, print and television journalists, and against their
employers, a newspaper publisher and a television
broadcaster. The employers had licensed a third-party
website to republish the print and audiovisual works of the
plaintiffs.' 37 Applying labor law as well as copyright law, the
court declared that the employers, without express consent
from the journalists, could not authorize the republication of
their works in a new mode of exploitation such as an Internet
web site.'38
134. See id. at 196-97.
135. See id. "[The newspapers differ from each as much as a matter of
ideology, philosophy, morals or politics, as a matter of the quality of the authors
of their articles .... the journalist writes for the largest public possible but
within the scope of the newspaper or magazine that publishes his/her work
(his/her newspaper or his/her magazine); whereas his/her article is inserted
among articles written by his/her colleagues, who work, within the context of
the same edition, within the same stream of ideas and in the same
publication .... [the journalist's ideas are] expressed in his/her articles for a
specific publication in a specific newspaper or magazine, imposing on the
Publishing Company ... an obligation of destination." See id.; see also
Association Generale des Journalistes Professionnels de Belgique v. S.C.R.L.
Central Station [19961, High Court of Brussels, translated in Symposium,
Symposium on Electronic Rights in International Perspective, 22 COLUM. -VLA
J.L. & ARTS 127, 191, 193 (1998).
136. See Union of French Journalists and National Syndicate of Journalists
v. SDV Plurimedia [1998], Tribunal de Grande Instance de Strasbourg,
Ordonnance de Rf6r6 Commercial, translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
199, 199-201 (1998).
137. See id. at 199.
138. See id. at 200-01.
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IV
International Implications of the Conflicting
Decisions
Not surprisingly, the European courts demonstrate
greater concern than their U.S. counterparts with the moral
rights of the journalists, especially with journalistic integrity.
Thus the European courts' opinions generally give greater
emphasis to the journalists' right to choose the medium in
which the work appears, and thereby to choose the political
or ideological context in which it will appear, as well as the
size, location, and political leanings of its intended audience.
In the U.S., even the pro-plaintiff Ryan decision was
unconcerned with moral rights.'3 9 In fact, the Ryan court was
not even sure it liked its own decision in plaintiffs' favor; the
court suggested that it felt constrained by the statute and its
legislative history to protect the author over the publisher.14 °
The two pro-defendant decisions, Freelens4' (Germany)
and Tasini42 (United States), both seem driven by the courts'
interest in protecting the nascent electronic media industries.
Thus, the journalists' rights in electronic media re-use of
their work are viewed as obstacles to the technological
progress and commercial expansion of the newly-emerging
computer businesses. Interestingly, the two countries with
arguably the strongest twentieth-century traditions of
industrial and technological strength are far more worried
about the fragility of young cyber-businesses than they are
about the rights of individual authors or the social value of
preserving the livelihoods of independent freelance
journalists. Perhaps one explanation is that both aging
industrial giants have recently seen Asian countries gain the
lead in the new electronic commerce. Perhaps both are
reacting to their competitive disadvantage by behaving more
like developing countries, giving reduced intellectual property
protection (here, reduced copyright protection to freelance
journalists). Or perhaps they are protecting their own
139. See Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1149-51.
140. See id.
141. See Landgericht Hamburg, Decision of the Regional Court of Hamburg,
September 24, 1997, translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, at 178-80.
142. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 825-27.
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electronic publishing businesses by reallocating intellectual
property rights, making cyber-publishers' commercial
transactions faster and cheaper by putting the burden of
transactional costs on authors instead.
Paradoxically, even though the U.S. and German courts
are the ones most protective of cyber-industries, and most
biased in favor of the potential growth and value of the new
industries (recall Tasini I's praise of services like NEXIS), they
nevertheless try to mask their bias by glossing over the
radical differences between CD-ROMs and electronic
database services on one hand and more traditional media
such as print and microfilm on the other. Countries like
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, while offering less
protection to the new electronic media than to authors, are
the ones more willing to admit cyber-media's revolutionary
nature and its immeasurable commercial potential. Those
opinions acknowledge the differences in function and format
between electronic media and traditional print and microfilm
and acknowledge the vastly larger, more global audience they
can reach.
The divergence of these national decisions on the
electronic media rights of freelance journalists may pose legal
problems for international trade in copyrighted works.'43
Suppose the U.S. Supreme Court were to uphold Tasini I's
broad interpretation of the § 201(c) revision privilege, or
suppose Congress were to amend the Copyright Act to codify
that broad reading. Under such a hypothetical, should NEXIS
be able to make its New York Times database available to
French, Belgian and Dutch users, if that means they would
be accessing articles for which the freelance authors' consent
had not been obtained? Under Tasini such consent is not
required although it is under French, Belgian, or Dutch law.
Could Plurimedia re-broadcast France 3 television programs
without the telejournalists' consent, if the viewers were all
U.S. Internet users, because U.S. law might permit such
electronic re-use as § 201(c) "revisions"?
If there were full territoriality in copyright law, so that the
laws of the country where protection is claimed govern all
aspects of copyright, then NEXIS would be in trouble in
143. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the
Private International Law of Copyright, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 165 (1998).
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France, but the coast would be clear under the hypothetical
above for Plurimedia Internet re-broadcasts in the U.S. The
Berne Convention does not specify a choice of law rule for
determining copyright ownership. 1" However, exceptions
already exist to the principle of territoriality in the Berne
Convention, limiting national treatment where issues related
to copyright ownership are being adjudicated. 4 5 Professor
Ginsburg proposes that copyright ownership be determined
by the source country (the country of origin, where the work
was first published)."' Thus not having electronic rights to
the France 3 programs under French law, Plurimedia could
not broadcast them for Internet reception in the U.S. if the
Tasini I court's reading of § 201(c) were codified in an
amended Copyright Act. On the other hand, NEXIS could
make its New York Times database available in the
Netherlands because NEXIS's rights to the freelance authors'
articles would be determined under U.S. law. A similar result
would be obtained by following the choice of law rule applied
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc.'47 Relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 222, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit treated copyright as any other
form of property, determining ownership by the law of the
jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the
property and the parties.
48
Under Ginsburg's proposal, limiting territoriality by
having source-country law determine copyright ownership
means that if Plurimedia could find a way to claim the U.S. as
its country of origin, it could then claim the § 201(c)
"revision" privilege with respect to freelance journalists' works
under the aforementioned hypothetical and proceed to
144. See id. at 168 ("it is generally true that the Berne Convention does not
resolve the question of the law applicable to copyright ownership"). See also
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 n.8 (2d
Cir. 1998) (the Berne Convention's principle of national treatment "is really not
a conflicts rule at all").
145. See Ginsburg, supra note 143 at 168-69. See also The Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of 1971,
reprinted in S. TREATY DOc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
146. See Ginsburg, supra note 143 at 169.
147. 153 F. 3d at 89 n.8.
148. See id. at 90. See also The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.,
25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (following the Second Circuit's
choice of law analysis in Itar-Tass).
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electronically republish them all over the world. In practice,
such exploitation of copyright law conflicts is less likely to
occur because pro-freelance-journalist jurisdictions like
France may decline to give effect to the § 201(c) privilege if it
were to be broadly construed, either judicially or
legislatively.' 49 According to Professor Jane C. Ginsburg, such
jurisdictions already limit the rights a foreign grantee or its
local licensee have received even where the grantee bargained
for the transfer of rights in the source country.' These
jurisdictions justify such limitations on transferred rights
when the rights transfer is governed by their substantive
copyright law (as opposed to contract law), or when the
transfer of rights conflicts with a strongly held public
policy.' 5 ' Thus, "it seems all the more unlikely that those host
country jurisdictions would credit a more expansive exercise
of rights than local law would allow when the publisher has
not bargained for the rights, but has simply received them by
operation of a source country 'privilege. ' ' 5 2 Ginsburg
recommends that courts in such international conflict-of-
copyright-law situations be flexible in applying international
rules regarding national treatment and, if necessary,
subordinate such rules to the principle of favor auctoris,
choosing the law that would be more favorable to authors." 3
This approach is consistent with the Berne Convention's
primary objective, which is "to protect, in as effective and
uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their
literary and artistic works.15 4
Professor Ginsburg explains how this approach would
work in practice:
[wihile the starting point for analysis of the choice of law
governing copyright ownership should be the law of the
149. See Ginsburg, supra note 143. The Second Circuit's approach to choice
of law would make such exploitation of conflicts more difficult than Ginsburg's
proposed source-country-determines-ownership rule. Where it might be
possible to manipulate points of attachment to a country of origin, it would be
harder to feign "'the most significant relationship' to the property and the
parties." See Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90.
150. See Ginsburg, supra note 143 at 174.
151. See id. at 173.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 174-75 and 175 n.38.
154. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris
Act of 1971, reprinted in S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.,
preamble cl. 1 (1986), qtd. in Ginsburg, supra note 143, at 174-75.
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source country (or of the contract), nonetheless where the
host country's legislation or caselaw expresses a strongly
author-protective public policy, it is likely that the host
country will decline to give effect to the otherwise applicable
law. This means, for example, that the host country that
seeks to protect authors against improvident grants might
recognize the transfer of fewer rights than the author
conveyed under the law of the source country. By contrast,
host country courts should look to the law of the source
country in order to ensure that application of the host
country's law will not result in giving the transferee more
rights than the author could convey in the source
country. "'
However, subordinating both national laws and
international conflicts-of-law rules to a "higher"
supranational pro-author principle creates new problems.
First, this fails to recognize the extent to which Tasini-like
disputes involve dueling authors. The 1976 Copyright Act, by
granting rights in collective works and other types of
compilations, acknowledges that there is original authorship
in the selection and arrangement of such works. A decision
contrary to Tasini, giving all electronic republication rights to
contributions to collective works back to the original
contributors, takes the added value created by the author
(publisher) of the collective work and presents it as a kind of
bonus to the contributor-author. So, a supranational
principle of favor auctoris poses the question of which author
to favor: the author of the collective work or the author of the
contributed work?
Second, although § 201(c) was created in order to
improve protection of authors' rights in contributed works, in
application the U.S. Copyright Act does not consistently place
authors' rights first. Rather, it strives to achieve an
instrumentalist balance between access and incentive. The
imposition of a uniform principle of favor auctoris, however,
would destroy this balance.
Third, the supranational principle approach is uncertain
and unpredictable. It seems risky to base one's international
commerce on the willingness of countries to subordinate both
their own laws and traditional conflict-of-law rules to a
principle as broad and subject to multiple interpretations as
favor the author."16
155. See Ginsburg, supra note 143, at 175.
156. See 1 NIMMER & GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE §
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One solution, a sort of quick-fix approach, would be for
the U.S. Supreme Court to affirm the Second Circuit's narrow
reading of the § 201(c) "revision" privilege. A judicially
developed test for a "revision" can take into consideration the
legislative history's distinctions between hard-copy revisions
and new uses like anthologies by looking at the physical and
conceptual context in which the contributed work appears.
And, consistent with the Copyright Act's overall goal of
balancing access and incentive, a judicially-developed test for
a "revision" ought to be multi-factored, including additional
criteria such as commercial similarity and similarity in the
nature of public access to the work.' 57 Alternately, the U.S.
Congress could amend the 1976 Copyright Act to
circumscribe the applications of § 201(c), or Congress could
add to the Act a new § 106 exclusive right: the right to
transmit work over a computer network or through other
electronic media. Either way, the effect would be to achieve
the same protection for freelance journalists in the U.S. as
they receive in many European countries and thus avert the
conflict-of-law problems described earlier. I5 8 Amending or re-
interpreting U.S. law in obtaining the same rights for
freelance journalists that some European nations provide
might also pressure pro-publisher countries like Germany
into conforming their laws to the international trend. This
solution, however, does not prevent the same problem from
occurring when other countries around the world adjudicate
disputes over electronic republication rights.
Certainly the differences in the European and U.S.
6[2][c][i] (Melvile B. Nimmer and Paul Edward Geller eds. 1997) ("[i]n most civil-
law jurisdictions, courts only exceptionally set aside normal choice-of-law rules
in the light of overriding considerations of public interest that are optimally
international in scope").
157. See supra notes 63 and 64.
158. Although individual countries might reach this result through very
different laws, by either applying copyright principles or contract law or labor
law, the laws would not conflict. There is no true conflict of law where there is a
uniformly compelled result. See I NIMMER & GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE § 6[2][c][i] (Mellville B. Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller, eds.
1997):
[tihe threshold inquiry is to determine whether a court faces a true or
false conflict. Suppose the jurisdictions whose laws might arguably
apply to a case all have interests compelling to one and the same result
in the case. In that event, there is no need for the court precipitously to
evaluate such interests, much less any choice of law: it may simply
reach that uniformly compelled result.
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decisions demonstrate how difficult it would be to harmonize
the substantive laws. For example, some countries resolve the
publisher-journalists' disputes by applying copyright law,
others by applying contract law and others applying a
mixture of the two., Furthermore, some are more concerned
with how electronic publication affects authors' moral rights
in their works while others care more about how electronic
publication might alter the balance between economic
incentives to create works and the public's need for access to
the works.
Another short term solution would be to harmonize
choice-of-law rules. If all nations adopted the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's approach of separating
copyright ownership from infringement issues and choosing
laws to determine the former based on the "most significant
relationships" test, publishers would be less able to exploit
international conflicts of laws to evade laws protecting
freelancers' electronic republication rights.5 9
Probably a better long range solution would be to include
in a future international copyright treaty a provision granting
to freelance journalists (or other non-employee contributors
to collective works) the electronic republication right to their
works.' 60 The fear in Tasini I and Freelens, that a pro-
freelancer position would hinder the newly-emerging
computer industries, seems unfounded. Traditional-media
publishers together with electronic-media publishers are
financially strong enough to bargain for these rights with
freelancers. Although there is something of a windfall in
giving the publisher-added-value in the contributed work to
the freelancer, the bargaining power of the two (publisher and
freelancer) is so disparate that the publisher could easily buy
back that windfall at little cost.
Of course, the treaty solution works better with respect to
159. See Itar-Tass 153 F.3d at 89 n.8; see also The Bridgeman Art Library,
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
160. Another possibility would be an international treaty provision
concerning new-media uses of a work. The provision could give authors the
reserved rights to all new-media uses of their work that did not exist or were not
reasonably foreseeable at the time they transferred rights, unless the authors
expressly contracted out of this right through a "new technology" clause in the
contract transferring rights. Or, like the Dutch copyright provision for film
works, see supra note 120, the provision could instead require the transferee to
pay equitable remuneration to the author for the new-media use.
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yet-unpublished works still to be bargained over than for
works already published. What if a newspaper wished to
create a CD-ROM of all its issues for the past ten years?
Would there just be gaps where certain authors withheld the
right to republish their works? Would the publisher be forced
to pay exorbitant fees to these hold-outs so that the CD-ROM
could claim completeness? And how marketable would it be
otherwise?
This hold-out problem could be solved through an
international treaty provision for mandatory licensing of
freelance-authored contributed works published prior to the
treaty. Although mandatory licensing would somewhat
diminish the significance of those authors' right to the
electronic republication of their works, it might be a fair
trade-off considering the windfall to the author of all the




In conclusion, the divergent international cases on the
electronic media rights of freelance journalists reflect the
difficulties of balancing the rights of authors against those of
publishers (who are also authors, of the collective works) in
the context of fostering rapidly-growing new electronic media
businesses. Providing U.S. freelancers with the same effective
protection they would receive in France, Belgium and the
Netherlands may be the best short-term solution. A legislative
or judicial narrowing of § 201(c) offering freelancers
protection of their electronic-media rights in their contributed
works comparable to what the laws of France, Belgium, and
the Netherlands provide might also pressure contrary
countries like Germany to conform to the international trend.
Another short-term solution would be to harmonize choice-of-
law rules, with all nations adopting an approach like that of
the Second Circuit, choosing the law governing copyright
ownership based on the "most significant relationships" test.
In the long term, however, the legal certainty and
predictability that international trade depends on would best
be promoted through a new international copyright treaty
that grants electronic republication rights to freelance
journalists while providing mandatory licensing for pre-treaty
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freelance works that have already been published.

